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Abstract
Abduction is usually defined as the process of inferring the best explanation of an observation.
There are many information processing operations that can be viewed as a search for an explanation.
For instance, diagnosis, natural language interpretation and plan recognition. This paper is concerned
about the following aspects of abduction: (i) what are the logical properties of abduction when it is
regarded as a form of inference? and (ii) how close is abduction to reversed deduction?
In the logic-based approach to abduction, the background theory is given by a consistent set of
formulas Σ . The notion of an explanation is defined by saying that a formula γ (consistent with Σ)
is an explanation of α ifΣ ∪ {γ } ` α. An explanatory relation is a binary relation B among formulas
where the intended meaning of α B γ is “γ is a preferred explanation of α”. To each explanatory
relation is associated a consequence relation |∼ab defined as follows: α |∼ab β if Σ ∪ {γ } ` β for
each γ such that α B γ .
The study of the logical properties of explanatory reasoning is approached by a systematic
analysis of |∼ab. We show that there are rationality postulates for abduction (i.e., constraints on the
explanatory relation B) that are, in a very precise sense, equivalent to rationality postulates (in the
Krauss–Lehmann–Magidor tradition) for nonmonotonic reasoning (i.e., for the relation |∼ab). This
tight correspondence between postulates for explanatory reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning will
make apparent a strong duality between these two forms of inference. Isolating the postulates and
showing this duality are the main contributions of the paper. We introduce the notion of a causal
explanatory relation and show its close connection with reversed nonmonotonic reasoning. Ó 1999
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1. Introduction
Abduction is usually defined as the process of inferring the best explanation of an
observation. There are many information processing operations that can be viewed as a
search for an explanation, and thus, as operations that perform some form of abduction.
(a) Diagnosis is the typical example of abduction. When a system (an electrical circuit,
a trade market or something as complex as a living being) is ill-functioning or not
functioning as expected, we seek for explanations that will help to return the system
to its normal state. If there is more than one explanation, usually some relevance or
simplicity criterion is invoked to guide the selection of the best explanation.
(b) We might need to explain an observation (input) α in order to give a meaning to
it, because α itself is just a string of symbols. For instance, when reading a text
we come across a word α that we do not know, we look up in a dictionary to give a
meaning to it. If α has several senses, we select one of them according to the context.
(c) We can also use abduction when trying to make a plan to achieve a goal or to decide
how to continue an activity. For example, in order to decide what to do after an
experiment is made (maybe to confirm or disprove a conjecture), the output data has
to be analyzed and then, in the best case, it will be explained by the background
theory.
A traditional model of abductive reasoning assumes a deductive relationship between
the explanandum (or fact to be explained) and its explanations. The basic idea is to
model abduction as reversed deduction plus some additional conditions. In this logic based
approach to abduction, the background theory is given by a consistent set of formulas
(which will be denoted by Σ) and a formula γ is said to be an explanation of α (with
respect to Σ) if Σ ∪ {γ } entails α. To avoid trivial explanations it is also required that
an explanation has to be a formula consistent with Σ . Since abduction is the process
of inferring the “best” explanation, this notion of explanation captures only possible or
candidate explanations of α. Thus some additional conditions are needed to define the key
notion of “preferred explanations”. We are concerned about the following three aspects of
abduction:
(i) what are the logical properties of abduction when it is regarded as a form of
inference?,
(ii) how close is abduction to reversed deduction?, and
(iii) since preference criteria for selecting explanations are so fundamental to abduction,
how is (i) and (ii) related to the selection mechanism?
Let us see these three aspects separately.
(i) Several people have studied the logical properties of abductive reasoning: Zadrozny
[20], Flach [5], Cialdea and Pirri [4] and Aliseda [2]. They have approached the problem
by isolating rationality postulates or rules that abductive reasoning should conform to. As
Zadronzny put it, abduction is an inference process that preserves sets of explanations.
The structural properties we are looking for should provide a clear picture of the peculiar
features that truly makes abduction a form of logical inference. The following are two basic
questions related to this aspect:
(a) How much a change of an observation affects its explanations? For instance, suppose
that γ is a preferred explanation of α ∧ β . Should γ be considered also a preferred
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explanation of α? Another example, if γ is a preferred explanation of α and also
of β , is γ a preferred explanation of α ∨ β? A related question: if γ is a preferred
explanation of α and γ ′ entails γ , should γ ′ be considered a preferred explanation
of α?
(b) Should changes on the background theory be allowed in other to explain an
observation? and how much a change of the background theory affects explanations?
For instance, suppose that γ is a preferred explanation of α with respect to Σ .
Should γ be also a preferred explanation of α but now with respect to Σ ∪ {β}?
There are many sources of motivating ideas for isolating the structural properties that
will account for these basic questions. First of all, there is a vast literature on different
areas of application of abduction: philosophy of science, linguistic, artificial intelligence,
computer science, etc. All of them provide a large variety of examples where to look at
for regularity patterns (see [5,20]). A second source of ideas is, of course, given by the
structural properties of logical deduction (both classical and nonclassical). These structural
properties has been studied (see [2,4]) in order to determine which of them could be
considered valid for explanatory reasoning and how to modify those which are not valid in
the context of abduction. For a comprehensive overview of abduction we refer the reader
to [2,17]. The main idea used in this paper for isolating rules for explanatory reasoning
will be explained in the following.
The examples given at the beginning of the introduction suggest that an important aspect
of abduction is the set of conclusions to which the best explanation leads to. In other words,
the consequences implied by the best explanation might be, in some cases, as relevant as
the explanation itself. These considerations suggest that a measure of the “rationality” of
an abductive method is given by the “rationality” of its “abductive consequences”. More
precisely, we view abduction as a binary relation between an observation and its preferred
explanations. Following Flach’s approach we work with a binary relation α B γ between
formulas which is read as saying γ is a preferred explanation of α. A rationality postulate
for explanatory reasoning is a property of B saying that this relation is “well-behaved”.
To each explanatory relation B we associate a consequence relation: given an
observation α, we infer from α the common consequences of all preferred explanations
of α. More formally, we define a consequence relation |∼ab by
α |∼ab β if Σ ∪ {γ } ` β for every γ such that α B γ . (1)
We read α |∼ab β as “normally, if α is observed then β also should be present”. In other
words, β is a concomitant feature of every situation where α usually occurs.
The definition of |∼ab is quite natural and, in fact, Levesque already suggested the idea of
defining such consequence relation as a new deductive operation that would be useful when
doing counterfactual experiments (see the concluding remarks of [13]). But the motivation
to introduce this definition came from [15] where a consequence relation quite similar
to |∼ab was used to model abductive reasoning. Moreover, the results of [15] shows that
|∼ab has very nice formal properties. The key idea to isolate the postulates for explanatory
reasoning is based in the interplay between B and |∼ab. We would like |∼ab to be a bona
fide consequence relation and for this end we have searched for postulates for B mainly
guided by the well known rationality postulates for consequence relations studied by Kraus
et al. [10], Makinson [16], Gärdenfors and Makinson [9] and many others.
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We think that the use of the KLM methodology for isolating the postulates is not only
an heuristic device but it also provides a fair enough justification for the postulates. The
results of our analysis will give a formal justification for most of the postulates introduced
by previous approaches and, in addition, it will shed new light on some aspects of abduction
that we think have not been studied (this will be clarified in the following paragraphs).
In relation to (b) it is clear that these questions implicitly have the assumption that
the background theory is also a parameter and thus that abduction is a ternary relation.
This issue was addressed by Cialdea–Pirri and Aliseda who presented rules that allows
some changes on Σ . However, they considered only changes that consists of adding
new formulas to Σ . This restriction is quite natural, since more substantial changes (like
contracting or revisingΣ) are not a trivial matter as it is by now well known from the theory
of belief revision developed by Gärdenfors and others [1,7]. In this paper the background
theory will be fixed and therefore only formulas consistent with Σ can be explained. This
can be considered a weakness since it has been argued that the more interesting observation
are those which are not consistent with the theory (“surprising observations”). Boutilier and
Becher [3] have presented a view of abduction based on the AGM theory for belief revision
[1] by exploiting the idea that observations inconsistent with the background theory can be
explained by revising the theory in order to make the observation either true or at least
possible. At a first glance our approach seems to be incompatible with the belief revision
approach because from this point of view Σ is considered a belief set and therefore as
something defeasible. On the other hand, we will give Σ the role of a system description
which is independent of the beliefs of the agent. The agent’s believes are about which parts
of the system are responsible for the observation but not about how the system is built. In
other words, Σ represents the known laws of the world and base on them we explain an
observation. 2 In spite of all this apparent differences, we will show in Section 4 that our
approach also has an “epistemic” reading in the sense of belief revision.
(ii) Zadronzny, Cialdea–Pirri and Aliseda argued that abduction is a different form of
reasoning and should not be reduced to reversed deduction. Flach’s postulates reduces
explanatory reasoning to reversed deduction (essentially because he did not include
preference in his formalism. Nevertheless, his result goes in a direction similar to ours).
The exact relationship between abduction and reversed deduction is however vague and,
to our knowledge, has not being clarified in a formal way. We will say that an explanatory
relation is causal if the following condition holds
α B γ iff Cab(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ γ ) (2)
whereCab(α)= {β: α |∼ab β} and |∼ab is defined as in (1) and Cn(X) is the set of classical
consequences of X (for X a set of formulas or a formula). We will argue in Section 3 that
(2) can formally be regarded as saying that B and |∼ab are dual objects and therefore that
causal explanatory reasoning is nonmonotonic reasoning-in-reverse. We will see several
examples of explanatory relations based on belief revision which are not causal (in our
sense). These examples will show that the main feature of causal explanatory relations is
2 A different but related problem is to repair Σ after some unexplainable fact is observed (or when the
explanation are shown to be incorrect by other means). We think this problem is very close related with inductive
reasoning and deserve a separated study.
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that they are based on a non defeasible notion of explanation (as opposite to those notions
based on belief).
(iii) As we have said one of the most distinct features of abduction is the emphasis it
makes on preferred explanations rather than possible explanations. Most formalism we
have mentioned include the notion of preference as an external requirement. Preference
criteria for selecting the best explanation are regarded as qualitative properties (a sort of a
simplicity criteria 3 ) which are not reducible to logical ones. Moreover, in those formalism,
the preference relation (for instance an order over formulas) is explicitly mentioned in
the postulates that intend to capture the notion of “best” explanation. Cialdea and Pirri’s
approach tries to use preference criteria for selecting explanations based on logic but
their results does not fully accomplish this goal since the preference relation has to be
represented in a separated theory. In [19] we have shown that preference criteria are
implicit in the logical properties of abduction and therefore they do not need to be explicitly
included as part of the postulates. In other words, the structural properties of explanatory
reasoning implicitly include an order encoding which are the preferred explanations. More
formally, we have shown that (under some conditions) for every explanatory relation B
there is an order relation ≺ such that α B γ iff γ is a ≺-minimal explanation of α.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce and study the postulates
for explanatory relations. In Section 3 we will show the tight relationship between our
postulates and the rationality postulates for consequence relations in the KLM style. We
will study causal explanatory relations and show that they are the formal counterpart of
nonmonotonic consequence relations. In Section 4 we will see how our approach is viewed
from the belief revision perspective. In Section 5 we will make precise comments about
the work of Flach, Cialdea–Pirri, Aliseda and others. In Section 6 we will make some final
remarks. Lists of the main postulates for consequence relations and explanatory relations
used in the paper will be found in Appendixes A and B, respectively. A summary of the
main results from Sections 2 and 3 will be given in Appendix C. The proofs will be given
in Appendix D.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared as a technical report of LIFL 1997 (Lille,
France) and part of it was presented at WOLLIC-97 (Brazil) and at NMR-98 (Italy).
2. Reasoning with explanations
The background theory denoted by Σ , will be a consistent set of formulas in a classical
propositional language. We will use the following notation: α `Σ β when Σ ∪ {α} ` β . 4
We could have avoided the use of `Σ and instead use a semantic entailment relation |=
satisfying the standard requirements (like compactness and the usual properties about ∨
and ∧). This way the background theory would be taken for granted and the notion of
explanation would be somewhat elliptical. But we have chosen to keep Σ for several
reasons. First of all, because it is customary in most presentation of abduction to have
a background theory. Secondly, because many examples are naturally presented with a
3 Occam’s razor: “Entia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda”.
4 Readers familiar with [15] should note that in that paper `Σ denotes a different relation.
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background theory that constrains the notion of explanation. And third, because by keeping
Σ we leave open the question regarding the properties of abduction when the background
theory is also considered a parameter.
We now introduce the notion of an explanation of a formula with respect to Σ .
Definition 2.1. For every formula α, the collection of explanations of α with respect to Σ
is denoted by Expla(α) and is defined as follows:
Expla(α)= {γ : γ 6`Σ⊥ & γ `Σ α}.
Notice that we have ruled out trivial explanations by asking that γ has to be consistent
withΣ . We are interested in studying the relation “γ is a preferred explanation of α” which
will be in most cases a proper subset of the relation “γ ∈ Expla(α)”. Our next definition
capture some of the ideas mentioned in the introduction.
Definition 2.2. Let Σ be a background theory. An explanatory relation for Σ will be any
binary relation B such that for every α and γ ,
α B γ ⇒ γ 6`Σ⊥ and γ `Σ α.
We read α B γ as saying that γ is a preferred explanation (with respect to Σ) of α. The
associated consequence relation is defined as follows
α |∼ab β def⇔ γ `Σ β for all γ such that α B γ .
We read α |∼ab β as “normally, when α is observed then β should also be present”. The
collection of all abductive consequence of an observation Cab(α) is defined as follows
Cab(α)= {β: α |∼ab β}.
In explanatory reasoning the input is an observation and the output is an explanation,
that is the reason to write α B γ with α as input and γ as output.
As we said in the introduction our initial and motivating idea was that |∼ab can be
used heuristically to isolate the logical properties of explanatory relations. These properties
will be called postulates for explanatory reasoning. We would like |∼ab to be a bona fide
consequence relation and for this end we have searched for the postulates mainly guided
by the well known KLM rationality postulates for consequence relations [10] (a list of the
main postulates for consequence relations is given in Appendix A). The first thing we need
is, of course, that |∼ab has to be reflexive, i.e., α |∼ab α for all α. This is obvious from the
fact that when α B γ then γ `Σ α. Notice also that if α `Σ β , then α |∼ab β . In particular,
if α `Σ⊥, then α |∼ab⊥.
A very natural assumption is to consider that explanatory relations are independent of
the syntax. In our context this is expressed by the rules Left Logical Equivalence (LLE)
and Right Logical Equivalence (RLE). Notice that these rules are somewhat stronger than
the usual rules for consequence relations, since our notion of logical equivalence uses `Σ
instead of `.
LLE If `Σ α↔ α′ and α B γ , then α′ B γ
RLE If `Σ γ ↔ γ ′ and α B γ , then α B γ ′
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Next we introduce a postulate called Explanatory Cautious Monotony (E-CM), since it
has the form of a monotonicity rule on the left.
E-CM If α B γ and γ `Σ β , then (α ∧ β)B γ
This rule says that a preferred explanation γ of a simple observation α will be a preferred
explanation of any observation more complex than α (like α ∧ β) which is also entailed
by γ . This seems quite natural because if we have decided that γ is a preferred explanation
of α and we know further that γ implies β , then based on a larger set of observations (like
α ∧ β) it is reasonable to think that γ is a preferred explanation of α ∧ β .
Now we will introduce the Explanatory Cut rules. These rules play an important role in
our setting and, as we will see, there is a duality between monotony rules for consequence
relations and cut rules for explanatory reasoning. Explanatory Cut rules relate the preferred
explanations of an observation α ∧ β and the preferred explanations of α. If we have a
complex observation (like α ∧ β), then we might have an explanation for it which is not
a preferred explanation for a simpler observation (like α). The observation of two facts
(symptoms) together or simultaneously “forces” to select an explanation which might not
be considered a preferred explanation when only one of the facts is observed. A Cut rule
will say that, in certain cases, a preferred explanation of the more complex observation
(α ∧ β) might also be a preferred explanation of the simpler or incomplete observation
(α). In other words, Cut rules allow to keep a preferred explanation even when the set
of observations is not longer complete. One could get an idea of the usefulness of an
Explanatory Cut rule by looking at a diagnosis process: if we know a fairly complete list
of a patient’s symptoms, then we might be able to decide which is the most likely illness
that caused them. However, what if we know only few of the symptoms? An Explanatory
Cut rule says that in certain cases this incomplete information suffices.
The first Cut rule we consider is the following
E-Cut If (α ∧ β)B γ , then β B γ
This rule is quite strong as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose B satisfies E-Cut, then |∼ab is monotonic.
Remark.
(i) It is easy to see that E-Cut is equivalent, under the presence of E-CM, to the
following rule: If α B γ and α `Σ β , then β B γ .
(ii) We consider E-Cut to be too strong to model the relation “γ is a preferred
explanation of α”. When γ is a preferred explanation of α, and α is an observation
logically stronger than β (i.e., α ` β), then the preferred explanations of β might
not include γ , because we might need “less” to explain β than to explain α (an
extreme case is when β is a consequence ofΣ). We will present examples of natural
explanatory relations which does not satisfy E-Cut. Among our cut rules, E-Cut is
essentially the only Cut rule we have seen in the literature.
We will consider in this paper two others Cut rules: Explanatory Cautious Cut (E-C-
Cut) and Explanatory Rational Cut (E-R-Cut).
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E-C-Cut If (α ∧ β)B γ and [α B δ⇒ δ `Σ β] for all δ, then α B γ
E-R-Cut If (α ∧ β)B γ and there is δ such that δ `Σ β and α B δ, then α B γ
Remark.
(i) Cut rules are the key fact for encoding preference criteria. Suppose (α ∧ β) B γ
and α 7 γ . This can be interpreted as saying that some part (β) of the observation
α ∧ β is more important than the other part (α) and therefore it cannot be ignored
when selecting the preferred explanations of the complete observation α ∧ β . This
will be clarified in the examples (see Section 2.1).
(ii) The meaning E-C-Cut is more easily grasp by analyzing its contrapositive: suppose
(α ∧ β)B γ and α 7 γ , then there exists δ such that α B δ and δ 6`Σ β . It says, in
particular, that if we are able to find a good explanation for α ∧ β , then we should
also be able to find a good explanation for α (but maybe a different one). E-R-Cut
can be stated in an equivalent form as follows: if γ is a good explanation of α ∧ β
but it is not a good explanation of α then any good explanation of α is consistent
with ¬β .
(iii) In [19] we show that E-R-Cut implies that preferred explanations (i.e., those
formulas γ such that α B γ for some α) are linearly pre-order. Moreover, when
the underlying language is finite, E-R-Cut turns out to be equivalent to assigning
a natural number to each formula and thus the preferred explanation of α are those
explanations of α with minimal value.
In general B is not reflexive, because a formula might not be a preferred explanation of
itself (this was already noticed in [4,5]), however there is a version of reflexivity that holds
in most cases.
E-Reflexivity If α B γ , then γ B γ
Suppose that E-CM and E-C-Cut hold. Let α B γ , then by E-CM we have (γ ∧ α)B γ .
It is easy to check that the hypothesis of E-C-Cut are satisfied and hence γ B γ . So we
have shown the following
Proposition 2.4. Let B an explanatory relation satisfying E-CM and E-C-Cut. Then
E-Reflexivity holds.
The following result shows that the postulates for explanatory relations considered so
far are the counterpart of cumulative consequence relations, i.e., relations satisfying the
following rules:
REF (Reflexivity) α |∼ α
LLE (Left Logical Equivalence) α |∼ β & ` α↔ γ ⇒ γ |∼ β
RW (Right Weakening) α |∼ β & ` β→ γ ⇒ α |∼ γ
CUT α ∧ β |∼ γ & α |∼ β⇒ α |∼ γ
CM (Cautious Monotony) α |∼ β & α |∼ γ ⇒ α ∧ γ |∼ β
Theorem 2.5. SupposeB satisfies LLE, E-CM and E-C-Cut, then |∼ab is cumulative.
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Now will address the problem of how explanatory relations treat disjunctions. We will
start by analyzing the right side. Consider the following postulates:
E-RW If α B γ and α B δ, then α B (γ ∨ δ)
ROR If α B (γ ∨ ρ), then α B γ or α B ρ
E-Disj If α B (γ ∨ ρ) and γ 6`Σ ⊥, then α B γ
RA If α B γ , γ ′ `Σ γ and γ ′ 6`Σ ⊥, then α B γ ′
Remark.
(i) In [13] it was argued that if α has more than one preferred explanation, then the
disjunction of all of them is the explanation that fully and nontrivially accounts
for α. The consequence relation |∼ab is capturing this intuition, since to compute
the abductive consequences of α is irrelevant whether the collection of preferred
explanations of α is closed under disjunctions. These considerations suggest E-RW.
This postulate will be called Explanatory Right Weakening. It is the only rule that
allows to weakening a preferred explanation. In Section 3 we will present a natural
family of explanatory relations satisfying E-RW.
(ii) Postulate ROR and E-Disj are called Right Or and Explanatory Disjunction,
respectively. Notice that ROR is weaker than E-Disj. We will show below that RA is
equivalent to E-Disj plus RLE. Postulate RA will be called Right And since it gives
some amount of monotony on the right. A similar postulate has been considered by
Flach [5]. RA says that any explanation more “complete” (i.e., logically stronger)
than a preferred explanation of α is also a preferred explanation of α. In Section 4
we will show that explanatory relations satisfying RA are based on a nondefeasible
notion of explanation.
Proposition 2.6. Let B be an explanatory relation.
(i) If B satisfies RA, then it satisfies RLE and ROR.
(ii) Suppose B satisfies RA. If α B γ and γ B δ, then α B δ. In other words, B is
transitive.
(iii) Suppose B satisfies E-CM and RA. If α B γ and γ 6`Σ ¬β , then there is γ ′ `Σ γ
such that
α B γ ′, γ ′ `Σ β and (α ∧ β)B γ ′.
(iv) E-Disj together with RLE is equivalent to RA.
(v) SupposeB satisfies E-CM, LLE and RA. Then{
γ : (α ∨ β)B γ }⊆ {γ : α B γ } ∪ {γ : β B γ } ∪{
γ : `Σ γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2), α B γ1, β B γ2
}
.
Definition 2.7. An explanatory relation is said to be E-preferential if satisfies LLE,
E-CM, E-C-Cut and RA.
The next result says that E-preferential explanatory relations captures our initial
motivation for introducing the postulates. Recall that a consequence relation |∼ is
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preferential if in addition to cumulative rules |∼ab satisfies the rule Or: for any formulas α,
β and γ if α |∼ab γ and β |∼ab γ then α ∨ β |∼ab γ .
Theorem 2.8. If B is an E-preferential explanatory relation, then |∼ab is preferential.
Remark. It is interesting to observe the analogy between Proposition 2.6(v) and the fact
that for a preferential consequence relation |∼, C(α) ∩ C(β) ⊆ C(α ∨ β) (where C(α)
denotes the set {β: α |∼ β}). In other words, the sets {γ : α B γ } and C(α) seem to play
dual roles.
We will continue using the properties of |∼ab as a guideline for isolating rationality
postulates for abduction. We will consider next the following postulates:
WDR (Weak Disjunctive Rationality) C(α ∨ β)⊆ Cn(C(α) ∪C(β))
DR (Disjunctive Rationality) if α ∨ β |∼ ρ then either α |∼ ρ or β |∼ ρ
RM (Rational Monotony) if α |∼ ρ and α 6|∼ ¬β , then α ∧ β |∼ ρ
These rules has been studied both from a semantics point of view [6,12] and a syntactical
point of view [16]. The new postulates for B will be related to properties satisfied by the
preferred explanations of a disjunctive formula. Which is not surprising, since WDR, DR
and RM impose constrains to the set of consequences of a disjunctive formula.
We will use two postulates for the left side:
LOR If α B γ and β B γ , then (α ∨ β)B γ
E-DR If α B γ and β B δ, then (α ∨ β)B γ or (α ∨ β)B δ
Remark.
(i) LOR is called Left Or. The intuition behind LOR is the following. Suppose that
when we observe either α or β (no matter which one) we are willing to accept that
γ is a very likely explanation for both of them. Now we are told that one of them is
observed (but maybe it is not known which one). Is it rational to conclude that γ is
still a very likely explanation of that observation (i.e., a very likely explanation of
α∨β)? LOR implies that the answer is yes. It is interesting to notice that LOR was
considered by Flach and Aliseda as a principle for confirmatory induction rather
than for explanatory inference.
(ii) We will show below that LOR corresponds to WDR. Freund [6] proved that, in
the case of finite languages, a preferential relation satisfies WDR iff it can be
represented by an injective preferential model.
(iii) It is easy to check that DR is equivalent to saying that C(α ∨ β) ⊆ C(α) ∪ C(β)
for every α and β . Hence, DR is stronger than WDR. We will show that the
corresponding postulate for explanatory relations is E-DR and thus we have called
it Explanatory Disjunctive Rationality.
Theorem 2.9. Suppose the language is finite and let B be an E-preferential explanatory
relation that satisfies LOR. Then |∼ab is preferential and satisfies WDR.
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Remark. We do not know if Theorem 2.9 holds when the language is infinite.
Proposition 2.10. Let B be an explanatory relation satisfying E-DR. Then B satisfies
LOR and |∼ab satisfies DR.
As a corollary of Theorems 2.8 and 2.10 we have
Theorem 2.11. Let B be an E-preferential explanatory relation that satisfies E-DR. Then
|∼ab is preferential and satisfies DR.
A relation |∼ is called Rational if it is preferential and satisfies Rational Monotony
(RM). The corresponding postulate for abduction is the cut rule we have called E-R-Cut.
We recall it: If (α ∧ β)B γ and there is δ such that δ `Σ β and α B δ, then α B γ .
Theorem 2.12. Let B be an E-preferential explanatory relation that satisfies E-R-Cut.
Then |∼ab is rational.
We will see next that E-R-Cut gives a fine structure to the set {γ : (α ∨ β)B γ }.
Proposition 2.13. SupposeB is an E-preferential explanatory relation that satisfies E-R-
Cut. Then for every α and β one of the following holds:
(a) {γ : (α ∨ β)B γ } = {γ : α B γ },
(b) {γ : (α ∨ β)B γ } = {γ : β B γ },
(c) {γ : α B γ } ∪ {γ : β B γ } ⊆ {γ : (α ∨ β)B γ } ⊆
{γ : α B γ } ∪ {γ : β B γ } ∪ {γ : `Σ γ ↔ (δ ∨ ρ) & α B δ & β B ρ}.
Remark. The second⊆ in (c) above could be an equality ifB satisfies E-RW. In this case,
Proposition 2.13 is the analogous of the following well known fact about rational relations
(which was found first in the context of belief revision [7,8]): If |∼ is rational then for every
α and β one of the following holds:
(a) C(α ∨ β)= C(α),
(b) C(α ∨ β)= C(β),
(c) C(α ∨ β)= C(α) ∩C(β).
The proof of Proposition 2.13 follows closely the proof of this fact about |∼ab.
It is well known that any rational relation satisfies DR [16]. We will show next the
corresponding result for E-DR (it will be used later in the paper).
Proposition 2.14. SupposeB is E-preferential and satisfies E-R-Cut. Then it also satisfies
E-DR.
On the light of the previous results we will complete Definition 2.7 as follows
Definition 2.15. Let Σ be a background theory and B be an explanatory relation. We say
that B is E-cumulative if it satisfies E-CM, E-C-Cut and LLE. B is E-preferential if it
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is E-cumulative and in addition satisfies RA. B is E-rational if it is E-preferential and in
addition satisfies E-R-Cut.
We are about to finish the presentation of the postulates for explanatory reasoning. There
is however one natural question that we have not considered yet: When an observation has
a preferred explanation? The following postulate, that we call Explanatory Consistency
Preservation, says that α has a preferred explanation iff it is consistent with Σ . Our last
results are somewhat technical but they will be needed in the sequel.
E-ConΣ: 6`Σ ¬α iff there is γ such that α B γ .
The corresponding postulate for consequence relations will be called Consistency
Preservation (with respect to Σ).
ConΣ: For every formula α, (i) α |∼⊥ iff `Σ ¬α and (ii) for every σ ∈Σ , α |∼ σ .
Part (ii) in ConΣ was included since it necessarily holds for |∼ab. The following
observation is obvious.
Proposition 2.16. Let B be an explanatory relation satisfying E-ConΣ , then |∼ab satisfies
ConΣ .
Under E-ConΣ , E-R-Cut is stronger than E-C-Cut. More precisely we have the
following
Proposition 2.17. Any explanatory relation satisfying E-ConΣ and E-R-Cut satisfies
E-C-Cut.
As a corollary of Propositions 2.14 and 2.17 we have the following result:
Proposition 2.18. Suppose that B satisfies LLE, E-CM, RA, E-R-Cut and E-ConΣ .
Then it also satisfies E-DR.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.12 and Propositions 2.16, 2.17 we have the following result:
Proposition 2.19. Let B be an explanatory relation that satisfies LLE, E-CM, E-R-Cut,
E-ConΣ , and RA. Then |∼ab is rational and satisfies ConΣ .
Proposition 2.20. SupposeB satisfies E-Cut and E-ConΣ , then |∼ab=`Σ .
2.1. Two examples
We will present examples of E-preferential and E-rational explanatory relations. Both
examples are based on preferential models. Preferential models are the main tool for
representing and studying nonmonotonic consequence relations (see [10] and references
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therein). Given an order of the models of Σ we define a notion of preferred explanation.
The intuition is that to explain an observation we only look at the closest worlds where the
observation holds. We will use the following notation: mod(S) denotes the set of models
of S, where S is a set of formulas (it could be a single formula). The general idea is the
following: Given a preference relation≺ on mod(Σ) and a formula α we define its minimal
models as usual:
min(α)= {N : N |=Σ ∪ {α} & M 6|= α for all M ≺N}.
Now we define an explanatory relation B as follows:
α B γ def⇔mod(Σ ∪ {γ })⊆min(α)
for any pair of consistent (with Σ) formulas α and γ . 5
It is not an accident that we use preferential models. In fact explanatory relations defined
this way are quite universal in the sense that many explanatory relations are of that form
(this will be addressed in Section 3).
We could have presented the examples just as a formal manipulation of symbols, but
instead we choose to provide a context where to interpret the symbols. This kind of inter-
pretations (that makes the reading more enjoyable) have a drawback: important aspects of
the context are not included into the formalism used to model it; so one get the impres-
sion that the formalism is an over simplification of the problems under consideration. Our
examples mainly pretend to illustrate some of the concepts we have introduced.
Example 1. Consider the following scenario. A message consisting of a finite sequence
of 0 and 1 is sent by either one of two independent senders A or B . Messages sent by A
always start with 0 and messages sent by B always start with 1. Sometimes only a por-
tion of the message is received and thus it is necessary to recover the lost part. The person
in charge of recovering messages, after many years of persistent work, has developed a
quite simple preference criterion for guessing the correct message. He has observed that
normally both A and B send messages starting with a constant sequence and moreover
the sequence has even length. Since the senders are independent of each other he has not
preference about who sends the message. To make the example manageable we will as-
sume that all messages have length 4. We will analyze later in the paper a similar example
allowing messages of any length.
The preference criterion can then be represented as follows:
{0100,0101,0110,0111,0001} {1000,1001,1010,1011,1110}
| |
| |
{0000,0010,0011} {1111,1100,1101}
5 When the language is infinite or≺ is not transitive it is necessary to require the so called smoothness condition:
for all formula α and all N |= Σ ∪ {α} which is not in min(α), there is M |= Σ ∪ {α} such that M ≺ N and
M ∈min(α). This condition obviously holds if ≺ is a well-founded pre-order, which will be the type of relations
used in this paper.
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Where the messages at the bottom are more preferred than those at the top, but there is no
relation between a message starting with 0 and a message starting with 1.
Let the letters a, b, c and d represent, in that order, the four digits of a message. The
language L is the propositional language in the variables a, b, c and d and Σ is the empty
set (any message can be either sent or received and there is no logical connection between
the digits of a given message). Every message is a valuation of L and therefore the prefer-
ence relation described above is a partial order over the collection of all interpretations of
the language. This partial order will be denoted by ≺. Notice that all valuations at the bot-
tom (or top) are mutually incomparable. Given a formula α we define its minimal models
min(α) as we said at the beginning of this section. We interpret min(α) as containing those
messages encoded by α that have the most preferred features. Thus our definition says that
γ is a preferred explanation for α if every message encoded by γ is one of the preferred
messages encoded by α. This is not quite the same as saying that every preferred message
encoded by γ is also one of the preferred messages encoded by α. The last statement holds
if we ask that min(γ )⊆min(α). This alternative will be considered later.
It is easy to show that α |∼ab β iff N |= β for all N ∈min(α). This can be stated equiva-
lently as mod(Cab(α))=min(α). Readers familiar with the theory of nonmonotonic conse-
quence relations will realize the motivation for our definition. We will make this connection
clear in the forthcoming sections.
It is not difficult to show that B is a E-preferential explanatory relation. We will not
proved this now since it is a consequence of a general result that will be shown later (see
Section 3.2). We will compute some preferred explanations.
Suppose that the portion of the message we were able to get is expressed by the for-
mula d (i.e., we only know that the fourth digit is 1). Then it is easy to check that the
most likely sent messages are 0011, 1101 or 1111. Thus the preferred explanation of d are
¬a∧¬b∧ c∧d , a∧b∧¬c∧d , a∧b∧ c∧d and the disjunction of them. In particular,B
is not reflexive, for instance d 7 d . Notice that d |∼ab (¬a ∧¬b ∨ a ∧ b), which reflects
the agent’s preferences.
Let us suppose that in addition we know that the second digit was 0. Now the observation
is encoded by ¬b∧ d . In this case the most likely sent messages are 0011, 1001 and 1011.
The formulas encoding these messages together with their disjunction are all the preferred
explanation of ¬b ∧ d . Notice that E-R-Cut fails. In fact, 1001 is a preferred explanation
of d ∧¬b which is not a preferred explanation of d but there is a preferred explanation of
d (namely 0011) that implies ¬b.
We have already suggested that there are other natural alternatives to define B based on
a preferential model. For example, requiring that min(γ ) ⊆ min(α) instead of mod(γ ) ⊆
min(α). The main difference of this alternative definition with respect to the one given
above is that the former is reflexive and fails to satisfy RA but the later is not. This will be
treated in Section 4.
Example 2. Leonidas, an old taxi driver, retired two month ago after 50 years of work.
He lent his car to Julio, a nephew of him. Every time Leonidas has an opportunity he
enjoyed himself by guessing which streets his nephew has driven his car by. Leonidas
just needs to ask a couple of questions and then he is able to tell very precisely the exact
route Julio took. He uses to say, making fun of Julio, “my car is more like a metro train
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P ← (2,4) ← (3,4) ← H 4th St.
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
(1,3) → (2,3) → (3,3) → (4,3) 3rd St.
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
(1,2) ← (2,2) ← K ← (4,2) 2nd St.
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
C → (2,1) → (3,1) → (4,1) 1th St.
1th Ave. 2nd Av. 3rd Av. 4th Av.
Fig. 1. Chacaito station is at C , La Hoyada station is at H , Café Kawi is at K and Cine Paraíso is at P .
that needs no driver and you are in the car not really to drive it but only to collect the
fare”. Once he got into a big trouble by trying to impress his nephew with his divining
skills. He could not help himself and approached a young couple that just got off the
car. Very politely he addressed them with his usual questions: “Where did you get in?”,
“Did you pass by Café Kawi?”, “Did you pass by Cine Paraíso?” The young couple got
into a awful argument. The outburst, Leonidas and Julio thought, had nothing to do with
the questions they asked. The young man said “we did pass by Café Kawi but not by
the movie theater” and she replied, “as usual, you were absent mind, thinking about god
knows what! We did not pass by the Café but we did pass by the theater”. That day Julio
made his uncle swear that he will never again bother his customers with such nagging
questions. The old taxi driver slowly walked away, then turned his head and smiling said
to Julio “You did pass by the movie theater, anyway”. The reason for Leonidas’ success in
guessing the routes was that he has given Julio very precise indications about which were
the best routes for avoiding traffic and finding good customers. He said to Julio: “Always
try to pass by either one of the two metro station Chacaito or La Hoyada. In case this is
not possible, then try to pass by either Café Kawi or Cine Paraíso. If neither of these two
alternatives are possible, do whatever you feel like”. Julio always follows Leonidas’ advice
to the letter.
The street map of the area covered by Leonidas’ car is indicated in Fig. 1.
To model this example we introduce one propositional variable zi,j for each one
of the 16 corners in the map. It is also convenient to add another 32 new variables
to denote the starting and ending points. Let si,j denote that the starting point was
at (i, j) and similarly ei,j for the ending point. The intended models (i.e., taxi rides)
will be paths through this map. We will only consider paths satisfying the following
constrains:
(i) a path has a unique starting and ending point,
(ii) a path should not intersect itself, and
(iii) a path can have only one connected component. Then Σ is the theory of all these
intended models.
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Leonidas’s preferences are given by a three level preferential model.
L0 =mod
(
Σ ∪ {z1,1 ∨ z4,4}
)
,
L1 =mod
(
Σ ∪ {¬z1,1 ∧¬z4,4, z3,2 ∨ z1,4}
)
,
L2 =mod(Σ) \ (L0 ∪L1).
This gives a total pre-order (i.e., a transitive and reflexive relation) of mod(Σ). The
explanatory relation B is defined as explained at the beginning of this section. So min(α)
consists of those models of Σ ∪ {α} which are minimal with respect to the pre-order
defined above. A general result, which will be proved later, guarantees that B is E-
rational, satisfies E-RW and, since Σ = L0 ∪ L1 ∪ L2 then B also satisfies E-ConΣ (see
Section 3.2).
Let us suppose that the couple got in the car at (3,4) and off the car at (2,2). Let α be
(z3,2∧¬z1,4 ∨ ¬z3,2∧z1,4)∧s3,4∧e2,2. Notice that Leonidas had the information encoded
by α. Since α has models in L0, then a preferred explanation of α must be a formula γ
such that mod(γ )⊆ L0 and γ `Σ α. It is clear that any path starting at (3,4) and ending at
(2,2) cannot pass byH . Hence any preferred explanation of α necessarily is a path passing
by C. From this it is easy to check that there is only one solution and it includes P . Notice
that there are several formulas describing this unique solution. For instance, s3,4 ∧ z1,3 ∧
z2,1∧ e2,2. We do not need to mention all corners in this path. Some of them will be forced
to be in the path by the rules ofΣ . Observe that the preferred explanations of α are exactly
the preferred explanations of ¬k ∧ p ∧ s3,4 ∧ e2,2 (here recall Proposition 2.13).
Let β be the following “observation” s2,1∧z2,2∧z2,3∧e2,4∧¬k∧¬z3,4. So β encodes
partial information about a ride that started at (2,1) and ended at (2,4), passed by (2,2),
(2,3) and did not pass neither by Café Kawi nor by (3,4). Any path satisfying β starts
at (2,1), then it cannot pass by C and since it does not pass by (3,4) then it cannot
pass by H . In fact, we have that β `Σ ¬z1,4 ∧ ¬z3,2 ∧ ¬z1,1 ∧ ¬z4,4. This says that all
models of β belong to L2. Therefore the preferred explanations of β are formulas all whose
models must be in L2. What if we do not know the starting point? For instance, let α be
z2,2 ∧ z2,3 ∧ e2,4 ∧ ¬k ∧ ¬z3,4. This observation is a weaker than β and moreover α has
models in L0 (for instance a path starting at C, then it goes to (2,1), then goes through 2nd
Ave. and finally stops at (2,4)). Hence none of the preferred explanations of β is a preferred
explanation of α. This example shows that some parts of an observation are more important
(because they are more relevant) than others and therefore cut rules must be constrained.
Let now β ′ be the following formula: s2,1 ∧ z2,3 ∧ e2,4 ∧¬k ∧¬z3,4. We claim that the
preferred explanations of β ′ are exactly the preferred explanations of β . In fact, it is easy
to check that there are preferred explanations of β ′ that implies z2,2. Then by E-R-Cut
we conclude that any preferred explanation of β is also a preferred explanation of β ′. This
says that in this case z2,2 is irrelevant and therefore can be ignored.
To relate the meaning of E-R-Cut with the ranked model that defines the explanatory re-
lation, let us suppose that (α ∧ β)B γ . The constrain in E-R-Cut says that there must exist
δ such that α B δ and δ `Σ β . This implies that min(α) are at the same level as min(α∧β),
therefore γ remains a preferred explanation for α.
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3. Explaining our reasoning
In the previous section we have shown that each explanatory relation has associated
a consequence relation which reflects many properties of the explanatory relation. The
intuition was: if you tell me how to explain an observation, then I will tell you which are its
usual or normal consequences. In this section we will address the converse of the previous
statement: If you know which are the normal consequences of an observation, can you
explain it? In this setting there are two obvious thing one has to remark. The first one is
that we are viewing the process of getting conclusions out of an observation and the process
of explaining it as dual processes. But then it is natural to ask: are these two processes one
the inverse of the other? To answer this question we will introduce a notion of causal
explanatory relation and show that it corresponds to explanatory mechanisms that can be
formally regarded as performing reversed nonmonotonic deduction.
The normal consequences of an observation will be given by a consequence relation |∼.
We will assume that every such |∼ is reflexive, i.e., α |∼ α for all α. The first thing we must
answer is under which conditions |∼ is of the form |∼ab. It is obvious from the definition
of |∼ab that the question is then when the following holds:
C(α)=
⋂{
Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }): C(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ })}. (3)
We formally introduce this condition in the following definition.
Definition 3.1. A consequence relation |∼ is said to be adequate with respect to Σ if (3)
holds for every formula α.
If B is an explanatory relation then, from the definition of |∼ab, it is clear that |∼ab is
adequate with respect to Σ . The classical entailment relation ` is adequate with respect to
{>} and `Σ is adequate with respect to Σ . If there is no danger of confusion we will just
say adequate instead of adequate with respect to Σ .
Given an adequate with respect to Σ consequence relation |∼ it is clear that α |∼ σ
for all σ ∈ Σ . Moreover, if α 6|∼⊥, then there must exist γ consistent with Σ such that
γ `Σ α. In particular, if α 6|∼⊥ then α is consistent with Σ . Hence |∼ almost satisfies
ConΣ except that it might happen that α |∼⊥ for some α consistent with Σ . Also observe
that an adequate consequence relation satisfies the following form of supraclassicality: if
α `Σ β , then α |∼ β .
The notion of an adequate consequence relation is relevant only if the language is
infinite. In fact, for a finite language, it is not hard to show that every consequence relation
satisfying the following mild conditions is adequate: (i) C(α)= Cn(C(α)) and (ii) α |∼ σ
for all α and all σ ∈Σ . However, for infinite languages there are even rational relations
satisfying ConΣ which are not adequate (see Example 5 in Section 3.2).
It is clear from (3) what should be the definition of the explanatory relation associated
with a consequence relation.
Definition 3.2. Let |∼ be a consequence relation |∼. We associate with |∼ a binary relation
B˜ as follows:
α B˜γ def⇔ γ 6`Σ⊥ & C(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }). (4)
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Notice that B˜ is indeed an explanatory relation (using that |∼ is reflexive). We have put a
tilde above the symbolB to remind the reader that this explanatory relation is defined using
a consequence relation |∼. Suppose that |∼ satisfies the following form of supraclassicality:
if α `Σ β , then α |∼ β . Then it is clear that if α B˜γ then γ |∼ α. However, in general γ |∼ α
does not imply α B˜γ as we will see in the examples. This suggests an alternative definition
which will be treated in Section 4.
The following result is easy to show.
Proposition 3.3. Every adequate consequence relation is of the form |∼ab.
The next theorem shows the correspondence between the postulates satisfied by |∼ and
those satisfied by B˜ .
Theorem 3.4. Let |∼ be an adequate consequence relation, then:
(1) B˜ satisfies RA, E-RW and RLE.
(2) If |∼ satisfies LLE, then B˜ satisfies LLE.
(3) If |∼ satisfies ConΣ , then B˜ satisfies E-ConΣ .
(4) If |∼ satisfies CM, then B˜ satisfies E-C-Cut.
(5) If |∼ satisfies the S-rule (i.e., α ∧ β |∼ ρ implies α |∼ β → ρ), then B˜ satisfies
E-CM.
(6) If |∼ satisfies WDR, then B˜ satisfies LOR.
(7) If |∼ is preferential and satisfies DR, then B˜ satisfies E-DR.
(8) If |∼ satisfies RM, then B˜ satisfies E-R-Cut.
(9) If |∼ is monotone, then B˜ satisfies E-Cut.
Remark.
(i) The hypothesis that |∼ is adequate is only used to show E-ConΣ and E-C-Cut.
(ii) It is interesting to notice that we needed the S-rule, which is part of the preferential
system, to get that B˜ satisfies E-CM which is part of the cumulative system for
explanatory relations.
Notice that Theorem 3.4 does not cover the case |∼ cumulative. We will handle this case
only for finite languages.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose the language is finite. Let |∼ be a cumulative relation such that
α |∼ σ for all α and all σ ∈Σ . Then there is an explanatory relation B satisfying, LLE,
RLE, E-CM and E-C-Cut such that |∼= |∼ab.
3.1. Causal explanatory relations and reversed deduction
In the previous section we have shown that many consequence relations are of the form
|∼ab. In this section we will address the dual question for explanatory relations. Namely,
which explanatory relations are of the form B˜ ? Let B be an explanatory relation and |∼ab
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its associated consequence relation. Let B˜ be the explanatory relation associated to |∼ab.
Then the question is whether B˜ is equal to B. Consider the following condition on B:
α B γ iff Cab(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ γ ). (5)
Then our question can be equivalently stated as: Which explanatory relations satisfy (5)?
First let us notice that in (5) the direction from left to right always holds. Condition (5)
says that B can be recuperated from |∼ab and thus explanatory reasoning based on B can
be viewed as performing a sort of reversed deduction with respect to |∼ab. We will give
more evidence about the last claim later in this section. The failure of (5) means that even
if we know that an agent is reasoning abductively, we might not be sure which explanatory
relation the agent is using. In other words, looking only at |∼ab we cannot tell what are the
agent’s preferred explanations. We will isolate (5) in the following definition.
Definition 3.6. An explanatory relations is said to be causal if it satisfies (5).
In the following sections we will show some examples of explanatory relations which
are far from being causal relations. Notice that |∼ab=`Σ for any explanatory relation
satisfying full reflexivity (i.e., α B α for every α consistent with Σ), thus such relations
cannot be causal unless they are trivial.
So far we have not presented any semantic characterization of explanatory relations. It
is not difficult to see that most causal explanatory relations can be easily characterized in
terms of preferential models. Cumulative, preferential and rational relations are represented
by cumulative, preferential and ranked models, respectively (see [6,10,12,18]). Those
models can also be used to represent causal explanatory relations. In fact, from (5) it
follows that one can check whether α B γ holds by looking at the model that represents
|∼ab. To give an example we state the theorem corresponding to E-rational causal relations.
Theorem 3.7. LetB be a causal E-rational explanatory relation satisfying E-ConΣ . Then
there is a ranked preferential model (mod(Σ),) such that for every γ consistent with Σ
α B γ iff mod(Σ ∪ {γ })⊆min(α).
Now we will address the question of when a relation is causal. The first observation is
that any relation of the form B˜ trivially satisfies E-RW and RA. We will need a bit more
than these two postulates to get a characterization of causal relations.
Consider the following postulate:
C Let α and γ be formulas consistent with Σ . If for all δ such that δ 6`Σ⊥ and δ `Σ γ
there is ρ such that α B ρ and ρ `Σ δ, then α B γ
This postulates says that if any consistent extension of γ can also be extended to a
preferred explanation of α, then γ itself is a preferred explanation of α. Postulate C is a
strong version of E-RW (in the presence of RA).
Proposition 3.8. Let B be an explanatory relation. The following are equivalent:
(i) B is causal;
(ii) B satisfies RA and C.
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Next result shows that reversed deduction is a very particular form of causal explanatory
reasoning. This result was essentially proved by Flach (he stated it differently, see
Section 5).
Proposition 3.9. Let B be an explanatory relation. The following are equivalent:
(i) B is causal and satisfies E-Cut and E-ConΣ ;
(ii) α B γ iff γ `Σ α and γ 6`Σ⊥.
If the language is finite, causal explanatory relations are characterized by RA and
E-RW. We will present a more general result that also applies to infinite languages. For that
end we will require that every observation has at most finitely many preferred explanations.
First, we introduce an auxiliary notion.
Definition 3.10. A set of formulas A is said to have an upper bound (in A with respect
to Σ) if there are finitely many formulas α1, . . . , αn ∈ A such that for all α ∈ A, α `Σ
(α1 ∨ · · ·∨αn) (i.e., α1 ∨ · · ·∨αn is an upper bound of A in the lattice of formulas modulo
Σ).
Definition 3.11. An explanatory relation B is said to be logically finite on the right and
denoted by RLF, if for every formula α the set {γ : α B γ } has an upper bound.
Notice that if the language is finite then every explanatory relation obviously satisfies
RLF.
Proposition 3.12. LetB be an explanatory relation satisfying RA, E-RW and RLF. Then
B is causal.
We will show in Section 3.2 an example of a causal explanatory relations which does
not satisfy RLF.
Corollary 3.13. Suppose the language is finite and let B be explanatory relation. Then B
is causal iff it satisfies E-RW and RA.
What kind of relations are not causal? The examples that we will present in Section 4
use a notion of explanation based on belief revision which is a typical notion that does not
satisfy RA.
3.2. More examples
It is easy to verified that the explanatory relations given in Section 2.1 are both causal.
In fact, as the language is finite, both examples are of the form B˜ for an adequate
consequence relations |∼. In Example 1 we have that |∼ is preferential since we have
used a partial order to define the preferential model and thus, by Theorem 3.4, B˜ is
E-preferential. In Example 2 the preference relation is a total pre-order and hence the
consequence relations is rational and the associated explanatory relation is E-rational.
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Example 3. This example is a minor modification of one given in [15]. Consider the
following scenario: Lisa lives in a high-rise and parks her car in the 16-floor parking
garage of her building. One morning, Lisa was looking for her car and did not find it
where she thought she left it the night before. She considered the possibility that she
was in the wrong floor and went to the next floor. There was also the possibility that
the car was stolen and she must had called the police, but Lisa looked for the elevator
and went to the next floor instead before taking the extreme decision of calling the police.
We could model part of her background theory as follows: Let the language consist of
the propositional variables {c, r, s, f,p}, where r stands for right_floor, c for car, s for
stolen_car, f for go_to_next_floor and p for call_police. The background theory Σ will
be the following:
Σ =

¬r → ¬c
s → ¬c
¬r → f
s → p
Lisa’s preference are linearly pre-ordered. She prefers “worlds” where her car has not been
stolen. In case the car is not found, she would think that she is not at the right place. So she
has a three level preferential model:
L0 =
{{r, c}},
L1 =
{{f }, {f,p}},
L2 =
{{r}, {r,p}, {r, f }, {r, c, f }, {r, c,p}, {r, s,p}, {r, f,p},
{r, s,p,f }, {r, c,p,f }, {s,p,f }}.
Notice that mod(Σ)= L0 ∪L1 ∪L2. L0 contains the initial states, in this case {r, c}. This
is what Lisa expected before arriving to the parking place: the car will be there and she will
not need to do anything else.
Let |∼ be the rational consequence relation associated to this ranked model. That is to
say
α |∼ β iff min(α)⊆mod(β).
Let B˜ be the explanatory relation associated to |∼. Since the language is finite then |∼
is adequate and by Theorem 3.4 we have that B˜ is E-rational. Notice that mod(Σ) =
L0 ∪ L1 ∪ L2, hence B˜ satisfies E-ConΣ . It is easy to check that the following
holds:
α B˜γ iff mod
(
Σ ∪ {γ })⊆min(α).
We have that
mod
(
C(¬c))= {{f }, {f,p}}.
It is easy to check that
mod
(
Σ ∪ {¬r})= {{f }, {f,p}, {s,p,f }}.
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Thus ¬c 6B˜¬r , but it is clear that ¬c B˜ (¬r ∧¬s). So ¬r is not enough to explain why the
car was not found. Since ¬r ∧¬s |∼ f , then Lisa will go to the next floor. Notice also that
s ∈ Expla(¬c), however ¬c 6B˜ s because
mod
(
Σ ∪ {s}) 6⊆ mod(C(¬c))
(Lisa does not wish to think that the car was stolen as an explanation for not finding it).
Observe also that s |∼ ¬c, so it is not sufficient that γ |∼ α in order that α B˜γ . Finally,
to illustrate how B˜ treats a disjunction, let us observe that C(¬c ∨ s) = C(¬c) and thus
(¬c∨ s) B˜ (¬r ∧¬s) but notice that s 6B˜ (¬r ∧¬s).
Example 4. This example is similar to Example 1 given in Section 2.1. Now we will
allow messages of any length, but we will consider the situation of only one sender. Again
the preference criterion is simple: messages starting with an even number of 0 are the
most preferred ones. To make easier the presentation for each n> 1 let γn be the formula
encoding the message of 2n+ 1 digits such that the first 2n digits are equal to 0 and the
(2n+ 1)th digit is equal to 1. Our language will be propositional on the countable set of
variables {p1,p2,p3, . . .} and Σ will be the empty set. 6 Let
L0 =
⋃
n>1
mod(γn)
and L1 consists of all valuations not in L0. We have then a two level ranked model. Let
|∼ be the rational consequence relation defined by this model and let B˜ be explanatory
relation associated with |∼. It is not difficult to check that |∼ is adequate and therefore by
Theorem 3.4 we have that B˜ is E-rational.
We will show that B˜ is not logically finite on the right. In fact, suppose that the only
portion of the message we were able to get only consists of ceros. Let us say
α =¬p3 ∧¬p5.
Then it is easy to check that mod(γn)⊆min(α) for all n> 3. Thus α B˜γn for all n> 3 and
therefore no preferred explanation of α is an upper bound for all preferred explanations
of α. This shows that B˜ is not logically finite on the right, but it is a causal explanatory
relation by definition.
On the other hand, if the portion of the message contains at least one 1, then there is an
upper bound for the set of preferred explanation for that message. For instance, let β (the
incomplete message received) be¬p2∧p5. Then γ1∧p5 and γ2 are preferred explanations
for β . In other words, the first five digits of the most likely messages sent are 00101, 00111
and 00001. In this case the upper bound is (γ1 ∧ p5)∨ γ2.
Example 5. We will present examples of an adequate and nonadequate relation for an
infinite language.
(i) Let {pi : i > 1} be the variables of the language and Σ = {p1}. Consider the
following two-level ranked preferential model: at the lowest level there will be only
one model,M , defined byM |= pi for all i > 1 and at the second level we put all the
other models of Σ (but not M). Let |∼ be the relation associated with this ranked
6 We could have put Σ = {¬p1} to make this example closer to Example 1. But this is not important.
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preferential model. Clearly |∼ satisfies ConΣ . Let α = p1. It is clear that C(α) =
Th(M), thus there is no γ (consistent with Σ) such that C(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }).
Therefore (3) does not hold because its right hand side contains all formulas and its
left hand side is equal to Th(M).
(ii) Let Σ be the empty background theory and as in (i) we define a two-level ranked
model: at the lowest level we put all models of p1 and at the second level we put the
other valuations of the language (i.e., those which do not satisfy p1). Let |∼ be the
rational relation associated with this ranked preferential model. We claim that |∼ is
adequate. In fact, let α be any consistent formula. We consider two cases:
(a) Suppose α ` ¬p1, then it is easy to check that C(α) = Cn(α). From this it
follows that (3) holds.
(b) Suppose α 6` ¬p1, then it is easy to check that C(α)= Cn(α∧p1) and as before
this implies that (3) holds.
4. Connection with belief revision
We will show in this section the connection of our approach with the theory of belief
revision. In particular, we will see the peculiar place that causal explanatory relations
occupy when they are viewed from the perspective of belief revision.
Belief revision is the process of changing the beliefs an agent has in order to incorporate
incoming information (which might contradict the old one). The best known formalism
for belief revision is the so called AGM postulates [1]. Let K be the belief set of an
agent (which we assume to be a propositional theory) and suppose that the new incoming
information is represented by a formula α. The revision of K with α is denoted by K ∗ α.
It is natural to assume thatK ∗α is also a belief set (i.e., closed under logical consequences)
and obviously that α ∈K ∗α. The AGM postulates impose other nontrivial conditions on ∗
in order to make minimal the changes it performs inK . For instance, if α is consistent with
K thenK ∗α = Cn(K ∪{α}). Gärdenfors and Makinson [9] have shown a tight connection
of belief revision with the theory of nonmonotonic consequence relations. Given an AGM
revision operator ∗ they define a consequence relation by letting α |∼K β if β ∈K ∗ α. In
words, its says that the agent is willing to conclude β from α in the case that β belongs to
the revised belief set obtained after α is incorporated intoK (using the revision operator ∗).
In [8] it is shown that |∼K is a rational consequence relation in the sense of Kraus et al. [10].
On the other hand, they also have shown that every rational consequence relation |∼ can
be represented as a consequence relation of the form |∼K . In fact, let |∼ be a rational
consequence relation and let
K = {α: > |∼ α}.
Define ∗ by K ∗ α = C(α). Then ∗ is a revision operator for K such that |∼ is equal to
|∼K . 7
7 Formally ∗ cannot be considered a revision operator because we have given only a description of how to revise
a single knowledge base, namely C(>), and ∗must be applicable to any knowledge base. Also ∗might not satisfy
one of the defining condition of an AGM operator. Namely, ∗might not preserve consistency: It can happen that α
is consistent but K ∗ α is inconsistent. To avoid this problem one has to restrict to rational consequence relations
that preserve consistency: α 6`⊥ iff α 6|∼⊥.
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The connection between abduction and belief revision was already observed by
Gärdenfors [7]. Boutilier and Becher [3] proposed a model of abduction based on the
revision of the epistemic state of an agent. Aliseda [2] consider modeling belief revision
with abduction (see also [14]). The main idea in all these papers is the same. We will follow
the terminology of [3]. They consider various forms of explaining α relative toK and to an
arbitrary (but fix) AGM revision operator. These type of explanations were called epistemic
explanations. Epistemic explanations capture the intuition that if the explanation were
believed, so too would be the observation. More precisely, they introduced the following.
Definition 4.1. 8 Let ∗ be an AGM revision operator andK be a consistent set of formulas.
An epistemic explanation for α relative to K and ∗ is any consistent formula γ such that
α ∈K ∗ γ .
It is not difficult to see that the notion of epistemic explanations does not satisfy
the postulate RA. Because if γ is an epistemic explanation of α, then γ ∧ δ is not
in general an epistemic explanation of α. The reason is that K ∗ (γ ∧ δ) is in general
very different from K ∗ γ . These notions of epistemic explanations “cannot be given a
truly causal interpretation because they are simple beliefs that induce belief in the fact
to be explained” [3]. The lack of a causal relationship between an observation and its
epistemic explanations is precisely where our notion of causal explanation differs from
theirs. There is also another very important difference. The relation “γ is an epistemic
explanation of α” is not an explanatory relation in our sense. This is simply because an
epistemic explanation might not have any deductive relationship with the explanandum.
However, as revision operator preserves consistency, it is easy to see that an epistemic
explanation has to be at least consistent with the explanandum. 9 We will make a
little detour in order to introduce a new concept that covers the notion of epistemic
explanations.
Definition 4.2. A binary relation |< is called a weak explanatory relation if for all α and γ
α|<γ ⇒ γ ∧ α 6`Σ⊥ .
Remark. Observe that for a weak explanatory relation its associate consequence relation
|∼ab is not necessarily reflexive. Thus |∼ab might lose one of its more basic features
and therefore it is not clear the role that |∼ab could play for studying weak explanatory
relations. All postulates we have introduced in Section 2 also apply to weak explanatory
relations. Some of the results proved for explanatory relations are valid for weak
explanatory relations. For instance Proposition 2.17 is valid. The proof of Proposition 2.10
works for weak explanatory relation, so E-DR implies LOR in this case too. It is easy
to check that any weak explanatory relation satisfying RA is necessary an explanatory
relation.
8 This definition corresponds to what Boutilier and Becher called predictive explanations. This notion is the
closer to our approach. We will not analyze other alternatives.
9 We are assuming here that Σ is the empty set. This is not a crucial assumption. Our claims can easily extended
to cover the case where Σ is not empty.
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Let’s go back to the main theme of this section. Recall the rational consequence relation
|∼K associated to an AGM revision operator. The notion of epistemic explanation can then
be restated as follows:
γ is an epistemic explanation for α iff γ |∼K α.
From this it is obvious what are the logical properties satisfied by epistemic explanations.
However, it is convenient to see which of our postulates for explanatory reasoning are
satisfied by epistemic explanations.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that Σ is the empty set. Let ∗ be an AGM revision operator
and K be a consistent set of formulas. Let |< be defined by α|<γ if γ is consistent and
α ∈ K ∗ γ . Then |< is a weak explanatory relation that satisfies LLE, RLE, E-CM,
E-RW, ROR, LOR, E-Cut and full reflexivity (i.e., α|<α for all consistent α).
Epistemic explanation are far from being causal in our sense, since RA does not hold.
Also let us remark that since transitivity of |∼ implies monotonicity, then the notion of
epistemic explanation is not transitive. 10
The notion of epistemic explanation is too permissive. We can restrict it by asking a bit
more from the explanations. Namely, we will say that γ is a strong epistemic explanation
of α if
K ∗ α ⊆K ∗ γ. (6)
In other words, after revising K with the explanation we obtain all beliefs corresponding
to the revision ofK with the observation. If we state this new definition in terms of |∼K we
get the following condition: CK(α)⊆ CK(γ ). Where, as usual, CK(α)= {β: α |∼K β}. It
is convenient to see this condition as defining a notion of an explanation with respect to
an arbitrary consequence relation |∼. More precisely, consider the following condition for
any γ such that γ 6|∼⊥
C(α)⊆ C(γ ). (7)
This condition was suggested by Flach (Lehmman [11] has some preliminaries results
about it 11). In our setting it is quite natural to require that |∼ satisfies ConΣ . The next
theorem shows which postulates are satisfied by this weak explanatory relation.
Proposition 4.4. Let |∼ be a preferential consequence relation satisfying ConΣ . Define
α|<γ if (7) holds for γ consistent with Σ . Then |< is a weak explanatory relation and
moreover:
(i) |< is transitive, full reflexive for Σ-consistent formulas and satisfies LLE, RLE,
E-CM, E-RW and E-C-Cut.
10 We should mention that the original definition of predictive explanation given by Boutilier and Becher
requieres an additional condition. When the observation α is entailed by K then they ask also that ¬γ ∈K ∗ ¬α
which captures the intuition that if the observation had been absent, so too would be the explanation. With this
extra restriction we have that E-C-Cut holds but we do not have neither E-Cut nor E-R-Cut.
11 We thank him for letting us have a copy of his manuscript.
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(ii) If in addition |∼ satisfies DR, then |< satisfies LOR.
(iii) If in addition |∼ satisfies RM, then |< satisfies E-DR, ROR and E-R-Cut.
Note that the relation |< (given in Proposition 4.4) satisfies E-Cut iff |∼ is monotonic.
This relation is also far form being causal, since RA does not hold.
Since K ∗ γ is supposed to be closed under logical consequences and in our setting
Σ ⊆ K ∗ γ , then we have that Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }) ⊆ K ∗ γ . This suggests another way of
strengthening (6). Consider the following notion of explanation
K ∗ α ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }). (8)
This is exactly the defining condition of a causal explanatory relation. Let us see this in
detail.
Let B be a causal explanatory relation. This means that the following holds
α B γ iff Cab(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ γ ). (9)
Suppose also that B is E-rational and satisfies E-ConΣ . Then by Theorem 2.12 we know
that |∼ab is a rational consequence relation satisfying ConΣ . As before, let ∗ be the revision
operator associated with |∼ab. 12 By definition Cab(α) is equal to K ∗ α and thus from (9)
we have the following
α B γ iff K ∗ α ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ γ )
which is exactly (8).
The initial knowledge base K is the collection {α: > |∼ab α}. That is to say
K =
⋂{
Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }): >B γ }.
K represents the agent’s belief before any observation is made. It is clear that Σ ⊆K and
moreover, by E-ConΣ , we have also thatΣ ⊆K ∗α for all α. Thus, after an observation is
made, the belief set K is revised without modifying Σ . It is not hard to check (using RA)
that an observation α is consistent with K iff there is γ such that >B γ and α B γ .
To give a precise interpretation of (8) we must consider the following condition
Cn(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }). (10)
This corresponds to the notion of explanation given by Flach’s postulates [5] and as we
have proven in Proposition 3.9 it also corresponds to causal explanatory relations satisfying
E-ConΣ and E-Cut. It is clear that (10) can be viewed as performing an expansion of the
knowledge base [1,7] instead of a revision.
Notice that (8) is stronger than (6). Thus any preferred explanation is a strong epistemic
explanation. However, rather than saying that γ normally implies α (as Boutilier and
Becher did) we say that γ implies everything that is normally implied by α. Condition
(8) keeps some of the “epistemic” flavor of the belief revision approach and at the
same time retains a strong causal relationship between an observation and its preferred
explanations. Causal explanatory relations treats differently observations and explanation.
12 As we said before, ∗ is not formally an AGM revision operator. However, it still captures the key idea of belief
revision, that is to say, to minimize the changes of K .
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An observation has associated some beliefs (the other “symptoms” that we believe usually
are also present) so we could say loosely that observations are treated as beliefs. However,
explanations are not treated as beliefs. This epistemological distinction seems to capture
the following idea. We might be wrong about which is the “real world” (i.e., the preference
relation might be incorrect), but we would like to be right about the causality relation used
to explain the features of whichever world we happen to prefer.
Example. To illustrate the differences between epistemic, strong epistemic and causal
explanations let’s go back to Lisa’s example in Section 3.2. In this exampleK is the theory
of {r, c} which correspond to what Lisa expected before arriving to the parking place. An
AGM revision operator is defined in the usual way: K ∗ α corresponds to the theory of the
minimal models of α (with respect to the total pre-order of mod(Σ) given in Section 3.2).
It is easy to verify that f is a strong epistemic explanation of ¬c (but notice that f ∧ r
is not). However, for us f is not even an explanation of ¬c since Σ ∪ {f } 6` ¬c. Another
instance, ¬r is a strong epistemic explanation of ¬c, it entails ¬c but it is not a preferred
explanation in our sense. On the other hand, ¬r ∧¬s is both a preferred explanation and a
strong epistemic explanation of ¬c. Finally, r ∧ p ∧¬c is an epistemic explanation of ¬c
but it is not a strong epistemic explanation of ¬c.
5. Related works
We will comment in this section about the connection of our results and the work of
Flach [5], Cialdea–Pirri [4], Aliseda [2], Lobo–Uzcátegui [15] and Zadrozny [20].
P. Flach
His work is the closest to ours. He presented some postulates for explanatory and
inductive reasoning. Some of our postulates are similar to his. He studied the relations
“γ is a possible inductive hypothesis given evidence α” and “γ is a possible explanation
of α” which he denotes by α|<γ . He did not assume that |< is an explanatory relation,
however one of his postulates implies that |< has to be weak explanatory. Flach uses a
satisfaction relation |= instead of `Σ and thus the background theory is not mentioned
explicitly. Below we will compare his postulates with ours.
I1. If α|<γ and |= α ∧ γ → β , then (α ∧ β)|<γ . When |< is assumed to be an explanatory
relation then it is not difficult to see that I1 is, in our context, equivalent to E-CM.
I2. If α|<γ and |= α ∧ γ → β , then (α ∧¬β)|6<γ . This says that |< is a weak explanatory
relation.
I3. If α|<γ and |= α ∧ γ → β , then α|<γ ∧ β . When |< is assumed to be an explanatory
relation I3 follows from RLE.
He considered two versions of Reflexivity:
I4. If α|<γ , then α|<α. This postulate will not be valid in general in our case, because α
might not be a preferred explanation of itself.
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I5. If α|<γ , then γ |<γ . We already have mentioned that I5 holds for explanatory relations
satisfying E-CM and E-C-Cut.
The other two postulates for induction I6 and I7 correspond to RLE and LLE,
respectively. Flach studied other postulates more specific of explanatory reasoning:
E1. If α|<δ, γ |<γ and |= γ → δ, then α|<γ . This postulate is essentially RA.
E2. If γ |<γ and ¬α|6<γ , then α|<α. This postulate does not necessarily hold in our case.
In our context, this rule is quite strange because it says that when a formula α is not a good
explanation for itself then any good explanation is a good explanation for the negation of α.
This rule will be valid in the monotonic case.
E3. If α|<(β ∧ γ ), then (β→ α)|<γ . This rule seems to be valid only in the monotonic
case.
E4. If α|<γ and β |<γ , then (α ∧ β)|<γ . This postulate is a consequence of E-CM.
E5. If α|<γ and |= α→ β , then β |<γ . This postulate implies E-Cut and in fact, it is
equivalent to E-Cut under the presence of E-CM.
He then presented five postulates for “confirmatory induction” which does not seem to be
applicable for explanatory reasoning, except for his postulate C4 which corresponds to our
LOR. For Flach “intuition constitutes the primary source of justification for his rationality
postulates”. Our results confirm that his intuition also has a formal justification. The more
important difference with our approach is that he did not consider weaker cut rules than
E-Cut thus his postulates force |∼ab to be monotonic. Moreover, his main representation
theorem for explanatory relations says that explanatory reasoning is restricted to reversed
deduction. More formally, he showed the following
Theorem. A binary relation |< satisfies I1–7 and E1–5 iff the following holds:
α|<γ iff |= γ → α.
We will sketch a proof of this result based on Proposition 3.9. Flach’s formalism does not
explicitly include a postulate similar to E-ConΣ . However, it follows from his postulates
that for a carefully chosen Σ our E-ConΣ holds (showing this fact is in part what makes
Flach’s proof long). We will assume that E-ConΣ holds and use `Σ instead of |=. Notice,
that by I4, I5 and E-ConΣ we have that a formula is admissible iff it is consistent with
Σ . First, one has to show that |< is an explanatory relation. In fact, by E3 and E-Cut one
gets that α|<γ iff (γ → α)|<> and from this it is not difficult to show using E-ConΣ that
|< is an explanatory relation. In order to use Proposition 3.9 it suffices to verify postulate
C. Suppose that γ and α are consistent with Σ and the hypothesis in postulate C hold.
First, using the hypothesis in C we have that γ ∧ α is consistent with Σ . Then, assuming
towards a contradiction that α|6<γ , we have that (γ → α)|6<>. From E5 and I4 it follows
that >|<>. Now apply E2 and get γ ∧¬α|<>, thus γ ∧¬α is consistent with Σ . Finally,
using again the hypothesis in C one gets ρ such that ρ `Σ γ ∧¬α and α|<ρ, from which
one gets a contradiction.
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Cialdea–Pirri
They defined a relation Σ ` γ ; α to capture the notion that “in the theory Σ , γ is a
good reason for α”. The definition of; is based on a preference relation over formulas as
follows. Let≺ be an irreflexive relation on formulas. The explanatory relationB associated
with ≺ is defined by:
α B γ ⇔ γ ∈min(Expla(α),≺). (11)
In other words, α B γ iff 6`Σ ¬γ , γ `Σ α and δ 6`Σ α for all δ such that δ ≺ γ . It is easy to
check that such explanatory relations always satisfy E-Reflexivity and E-CM.
They presented some basic postulates and some conditions where they hold. Our
postulate E-CM is stronger than their And-Right. Their Left Logical Equivalence is our
RLE. Our Cut rules (E-C-Cut, E-R-Cut and E-Cut) have nothing to do with their E-Cut.
Here there is an important difference between our approach and theirs. As we said in the
introduction, we consider the background theory Σ fixed, but they considered postulates
concerning properties of abduction when the background theory changes. For instance,
their E-Cut rule says
If Σ ` α andΣ ∪ {α} ` γ ; β, then Σ ` γ ; β.
and their E-Monotonicity rule says
If Σ ` α andΣ ` γ ; β, then Σ ∪ {α} ` γ ; β.
These last two postulates are very weak, since they are valid for every explanatory relation
B defined as in (11) regardless of the preference relation ≺ used. They did not study the
problem of whether their postulates will guarantee that; is given by a preference relation
(this will be addressed in [19]).
Atocha Aliseda
Her Ph.D. Thesis is a comprehensive presentation of abduction from several points of
view. It is a very good source for the vast literature on abduction. We will make some
comments only about the part of her work which is close related to our paper. Similar to
Cialcea and Pirri’s approach, Aliseda regards abduction as a relation with three parameters:
a background theory, an observation and an explanation. Her notation is Σ | γ ⇒ α to
express that γ is an explanation for α with respect to Σ . She presented sets of rules for
various versions of abduction: Plain, Consistent, Explanatory, Minimal and Preferential
abduction. Some of her postulates are not valid in our context, for instance her Weak
Explanatory Reflexivity says
If Σ | γ ⇒ α, then Σ | α⇒ α
which is Flach’s I4 and, as we already said, it is not valid in our context because in most
cases an observation is not a preferred explanation of itself. She also consider cut and
monotonicity rules similar to those used by Cialcea and Pirri. However, no cut rule for
observations (as ours) was studied, except the rule of transitivity (which follows from RA).
Among all versions of abduction she considered, Preferential abduction is the closest to our
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approach. It naturally requires that γ has to be minimal with respect to a preference relation
among formula. The crucial rule for axiomatizing Preferential abduction is the following:
If Σ | γ ⇒ α and γ ∧ δ < γ , then Σ | γ ∧ δ⇒ α
where< is a preference order among formulas. Aliseda does not view this rule as structural
rule since it requieres a preference relation that she thought cannot be expressed in terms
of the inference relation itself. But we have shown in [19] that preference criteria can be
coded by the structural rules without explicitly mention them.
Lobo–Uzcátegui
In logic-based abduction usually together with the background theory Σ there is also a
distinguished set of atoms Ab called abducibles. Formulas using only atoms from Ab are
also called abducible. The pair (Σ,Ab) is referred to as the Abductive framework. Let |∼ be
a consequence relation satisfying ConΣ . An Ab-explanation of α is any abducible formula
γ consistent with Σ such that γ |∼ α. Thus this notion of explanation is similar to the
notion of epistemic explanation. Assuming the language is finite, the cautious explanation
of α, denoted by Fc(α), is defined as the disjunction of all Ab-explanations of α. Define
|∼a by letting α |∼a β if Fc(α) |∼ β . This type of consequence relations |∼a (especially
when |∼ is rational) were studied in [15]. Notice that if γ |∼ β for all Ab-explanation γ of
α, then α |∼a β . However, the converse is not true because in the definition of |∼a there is
an implicit selection of some Ab-explanation of α as the preferred ones. The relation |∼ab
introduced in this paper was motivated by |∼a . The role of abducibles formulas in [15] is
quite closed to our admissible formulas.
W. Zadrozny
He approached abduction from a quite abstract point of view based on the concept of
invariant of reasoning. Abduction is viewed as an inference process that preserves sets of
explanations. It is not clear the relation with our results, but it seems an interesting topic
of research. He has some rules similar to ours but his presentation is quite complex. His
explanation systems are formulated using higher-order logic as a metalanguage.
6. Conclusions
We have analyzed two aspects of explanatory reasoning: Its logical properties and its
relation with reversed deduction. The logical properties have been isolated in a fairly
complete list of postulates. Some of our postulates are similar to some of those introduced
by previous approaches (Flach, Cialdea–Pirri and Aliseda). The key idea was to use |∼ab
as an heuristic device for isolating the logical properties of an explanatory relation B. It is
important to point out the special role that explanatory cut rules play in our presentation.
We have not seen these rules in other formalism.
When we started this research we were focused on getting |∼ab to have good properties
in the KLM sense. Moreover, we thought that an explanatory relation B and its associated
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consequence relation |∼ab were somewhat interchangeable. But this turns out to be true
only for those explanatory relations that we have called causal. For a noncausal explanatory
relation there is a lost of information when going fromB to |∼ab. Because in this case, even
if we know that an agent is reasoning abductively, we might not be sure which explanatory
relation the agent is using. In other words, looking only at |∼ab we cannot tell what are the
agent’s preferred explanations.
We have shown that causal explanatory reasoning is nonmonotonic reasoning in reverse.
This answers one of our initial questions. However, it is important to remark a difference
between the postulates for explanatory relations and nonmonotonic consequence relations.
The basic postulates (in the KLM style) for nonmonotonic consequence relations can be
stated as inference rules in a propositional language, but for explanatory relation some of
the basic postulates (like E-C-Cut and C) are expressed as first-order properties of B.
Causal explanatory relations have also a interpretation in terms of belief revision. The
key feature that distinguishes causal explanations from other notions of explanations is
the fact that causal explanatory relations treat observations and explanations in a different
way. An observation has associated some beliefs (the other “symptoms” that we believe
usually are also present) so we could say loosely that observations are treated as beliefs.
However, explanations are not treated as beliefs and the deductive relationship between an
observation and its preferred explanations is retained in a very strong form. The underlying
idea of causal explanatory relations is the following. After observing α, we first collect the
concomitant facts that are normally present (i.e., we compute Cab(α)) and then we select
the preferred explanations of α as those formulas that entails α and its usual consequences
Cab(α). In other words, rather than saying that γ normally implies α we say that γ implies
everything normally implied by α.
Finally, we will mention two possible lines of research related to our results. The
first one is to study more carefully the hierarchy we have presented for classifying the
logical properties of abduction. Specially relevant is to determine up to which extend this
hierarchy classifies (noncausal) weak explanatory relations. The second one is related to
the role of the background theory. Usually it is said there are three kinds of reasoning
processes: deductive, abductive and inductive. We have shown that abduction is very tightly
related to a “nonmonotonic-deduction”. On the other hand, inductive reasoning (when it
is understood as the process of inferring general rules out of specific observations) did
not play any role in our setting. This is probably due to the fact that we have fixed the
background theory. There are many situations where Σ is the natural outcome of an
inductive reasoning process. As we said in the introduction, Cialdea–Pirri and Aliseda
presented a view of abduction as a relation with three parameters: an observation, an
explanation and a background theory. We think that an extension of our results, to the
more general case where the background theory is allowed to change, will provide some
hints for a better understanding of inductive reasoning.
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Appendix A. Rationality postulates for consequence relations
To make easier the reading of the paper we will include a list of all rationality postulates
for consequence relations used in the paper.
REF (Reflexivity) α |∼ α
LLE (Left Logical equivalence) α |∼ β & ` α↔ γ ⇒ γ |∼ β
RW (Right Weakening) α |∼ β & ` β→ γ ⇒ α |∼ γ
CUT α ∧ β |∼ γ & α |∼ β ⇒ α |∼ γ
CM (Cautious Monotony) α |∼ β & α |∼ γ ⇒ α ∧ γ |∼ β
OR α |∼ γ & β |∼ γ ⇒ α ∨ β |∼ γ
S α ∧ β |∼ γ ⇒ α |∼ β→ γ
DR (Disjunctive Rationality) α ∨ β |∼ ρ ⇒ α |∼ ρ or β |∼ ρ
RM (Rational Monotony) α |∼ ρ & α 6|∼ ¬β ⇒ α ∧ β |∼ ρ
Mono (Monotony) α |∼ γ ⇒ α ∧ β |∼ γ
An inference relation |∼ is said to be cumulative if it satisfies the rules REF, LLE, RW,
CUT and CM. A consequence relation is called preferential if it satisfies, in addition to
cumulative rules, the rule OR and it is called rational if it is preferential and satisfies
RM. |∼ is monotone if it satisfies Mono. A consequence relation satisfies WDR if
C(α ∨ β) ⊆ Cn(C(α) ∪ C(β)), for every formulas α and β . We used also ConΣ (Σ-
consistency preservation) which is a variant of a postulate introduced in [9]: for all α,
α |∼⊥ iff `Σ ¬α and if σ ∈Σ , then α |∼ σ .
Appendix B. Rationality postulates for explanatory relations
We list below all postulates for explanatory relations that we have introduced in this
paper.
LLE ( `Σ α↔ α′)& α B γ ⇒ α B γ ′
RLE ( `Σ γ ↔ γ ′)& α B γ ⇒ α B γ ′
E-CM α B γ & γ `Σ β ⇒ (α ∧ β)B γ
E-Cut (α ∧ β)B γ ⇒ β B γ
E-C-Cut (α ∧ β)B γ & ∀δ (α B δ⇒ δ `Σ β) ⇒ α B γ
E-R-Cut (α ∧ β)B γ & ∃δ [α B δ & δ `Σ β] ⇒ α B γ
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E-Reflexivity α B γ ⇒ γ B γ
E-RW α B γ & α B δ ⇒ α B (γ ∨ δ)
ROR α B γ ∨ ρ ⇒ α B γ or α B ρ
E-Disj γ 6`Σ⊥& ρ 6`Σ⊥& α B (γ ∨ ρ) ⇒ α B γ & α B ρ
RA α B γ & γ ′ `Σ γ & γ ′ 6`Σ⊥ ⇒ α B γ ′
LOR α B γ & β B γ ⇒ (α ∨ β)B γ
E-DR α B γ & β B δ ⇒ (α ∨ β)B γ or (α ∨ β)B δ
E-ConΣ 6`Σ ¬α ⇔ ∃γ α B γ
C Let α and γ be formulas consistent with Σ . If for all δ such that δ 6`Σ⊥ and δ `Σ γ
there is ρ such that α B ρ and ρ `Σ δ, then α B γ .
Appendix C. Summary of the main results in Sections 2 and 3
See Tables C.1 and C.2.
Table C.1
From explanatory relations to consequence relations
B |∼ab
⇒ Adequate + REF + RW
E-ConΣ ⇒ ConΣ
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut ⇒ Cumulative
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA ⇒ Preferential
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + LOR + finite language ⇒ Preferential +WDR
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + E-DR ⇒ Preferential + DR
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + E-R-Cut ⇒ Rational
E-Cut ⇒ Monotonic
Table C.2
From consequence relations to explanatory relations
B˜ |∼ adequate
RA + RLE + E-RW ⇐
E-ConΣ ⇐ ConΣ
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + RLE + E-RW ⇐ Preferential
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + LOR + RLE + E-RW ⇐ Preferential +WDR
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + E-DR + RLE + E-RW ⇐ Preferential + DR
LLE + E-CM + E-C-Cut + RA + E-R-Cut + RLE + E-RW ⇐ Rational
E-Cut + RA + RLE + E-RW ⇐ Monotonic
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Appendix D. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Suppose α |∼ab ρ, i.e., for all γ if α B γ then γ `Σ ρ. Let
δ be any formula such that (α ∧ β) B δ. By E-Cut we have α B δ so δ `Σ ρ. Thus
(α ∧ β) |∼ab ρ. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Suppose B is a relation as in the hypothesis. We will show
that |∼ab is cumulative. From LLE for B we easily get that |∼ab satisfies Left Logical
Equivalence and from the definition of |∼ab (Definition 2.2) it is obvious that Reflexivity
and RW holds. It remains to be checked the rules Cut and Cautious Monotony.
Let’s suppose that α |∼ab β , then the second condition in the rule E-C-Cut is satisfied,
i.e., ∀δ [α B δ⇒ `Σ δ→ β]. Therefore from E-C-Cut and E-CM we easily conclude
{γ : α B γ } = {γ : (α ∧ β)B γ }
and hence C(α ∧ β)= C(α) (where as usual for a fixed consequence relation |∼ and any
formula δ, C(δ) is the set {θ : δ |∼ θ}). That is to say, |∼ab satisfies Cut and Cautious
Monotony. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.6. (i) That RLE holds is straightforward. To see that ROR holds,
suppose that α B (γ ∨ ρ). First note that (γ ∨ ρ) 6`Σ ¬γ or (γ ∨ ρ) 6`Σ ¬ρ. Otherwise,
(γ ∨ ρ) `Σ (¬γ ∧ ¬ρ) and hence (γ ∨ ρ) `Σ ⊥, which is a contradiction since B is an
explanatory relation. Therefore by RA α B (γ ∨ ρ)∧ γ or α B (γ ∨ ρ)∧ ρ. Hence by
RLE α B γ or α B ρ.
(ii) and (iii) are straightforward.
(iv) The proof that RA implies E-Disj is as in (i) above. Conversely suppose that B
satisfies E-Disj and RLE, we want to show that RA holds. Let α, γ and γ ′ be such that
α B γ , γ ′ `Σ γ and γ ′ 6`Σ ⊥. Since γ ′ `Σ γ , we have `Σ γ ↔ (γ ′ ∨ γ ) so by RLE
α B (γ ′ ∨ γ ). Since by hypothesis γ ′ 6`Σ ⊥ then by E-Disj we have α B γ ′.
(v) Suppose (α1 ∨ α2)B γ and αi 7 γ for i = 1,2. We claim that γ 6`Σ αi for i = 1,2.
Otherwise by E-CM we have for some i ∈ {1,2}, (α1 ∨ α2)∧ αi B γ and therefore by
LLE we conclude αi B γ which is a contradiction. Let γi = γ ∧αi . Since γ `Σ (α1 ∨α2),
then it is clear that γ is equivalent modulo Σ to γ1 ∨ γ2. On the other hand, γi `Σ αi
and γi 6`Σ ⊥ for i = 1,2 (otherwise γ `Σ αi for some i). Finally by RA we have that
(α1 ∨ α2)B γi and by E-CM and LLE we conclude αi B γi for i = 1,2. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.8. We already know from Theorem 2.5 that |∼ab is cumulative, so
it remains to be shown that |∼ab satisfies the rule Or. Let’s suppose that α |∼ab ρ and
β |∼ab ρ, we will show that α∨β |∼ab ρ. Let γ be such that (α ∨ β)B γ , we have to show
that γ `Σ ρ. By Proposition 2.6(v) we have to consider three cases:
(a) α B γ . Since α |∼ab ρ then we have γ `Σ ρ.
(b) β B γ . We conclude that γ `Σ ρ as in the first case.
(c) There are γ1 and γ2 such that `Σ γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2) with α B γ1 β B γ2.
Then, by hypotheses we have γi `Σ ρ for i = 1,2. Since `Σ γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2) we conclude
γ `Σ ρ. 2
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Proof of Theorem 2.9. By Theorem 2.8 we know that |∼ab is preferential. So it remains to
be shown that |∼ab satisfies WDR. We define an auxiliary function F that maps formulas
into formulas as follows: F(α) = ∨{γ : α B γ } in case there is γ such that α B γ ,
otherwise we let F(α)=⊥. Notice that α |∼ab β iff F(α) `Σ β . To see that WDR holds it
clearly suffices to show that F(α)∧F(β) `Σ F(α ∨β). Let α B γ and β B δ, it is enough
to verify that when γ ∧ δ is consistent with Σ , then (α ∨ β)B (γ ∧ δ). Since 6`Σ γ →¬δ,
from RA we easily conclude α B (γ ∧ δ) and β B (γ ∧ δ), therefore from LOR we obtain
(α ∨ β)B (γ ∧ δ). 2
Proof of Proposition 2.10. It is clear that E-DR implies LOR. To check that E-DR
implies that |∼ab satisfies DR, suppose that α ∨ β |∼ab ρ and α 6|∼ab ρ. We have to show
that β |∼ab ρ. Let δ be such that β B δ, it suffices to check that δ `Σ ρ. Since α 6|∼ab ρ,
then there is γ such that α B γ and γ 6`Σ ρ. By E-DR (α ∨ β)B γ or (α ∨ β)B δ. Since
α ∨ β |∼ab ρ and γ 6`Σ ρ, we conclude that (α ∨ β)B δ. Therefore δ `Σ ρ. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.12. By Theorem 2.8 |∼ab is preferential. Thus it suffices to show
that |∼ab satisfies Rational Monotony. Let α, β and ρ be formulas such that α |∼ab ρ
and α 6|∼ab ¬β . Let γ be such that (α ∧ β) B γ , we want to show that γ `Σ ρ. Since
α 6|∼ab ¬β , then by definition of |∼ab there is δ such that α B δ and δ 6`Σ ¬β . By RA (see
Proposition 2.6(iii)) there is δ′ `Σ δ such that α B δ′ and δ′ `Σ β . Therefore by E-R-Cut
we conclude that α B γ . Since α |∼ab ρ, then γ `Σ ρ. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.13. We will consider three cases.
(Case 1) Suppose that (α ∨ β) |∼ab ¬α. In particular, we have that for all (α ∨ β)B γ ,
γ `Σ β . We will show that (b) holds. Let γ be such that (α ∨ β) B γ . Then by our
hypothesis γ `Σ β . By E-CM (α ∨ β)∧ β B γ and by LLE β B γ . On the other hand,
let γ be such that β B γ , then by E-CM (α ∨ β)∧ β B γ . Since (α ∨ β) |∼ab ¬α, then it
follows from E-C-Cut that (α ∨ β)B γ .
(Case 2) Suppose that (α ∨ β) |∼ab ¬β . Then as in case 1 it follows that (a) holds.
(Case 3) Suppose that (α∨β) 6|∼ab ¬α and (α∨β) 6|∼ab ¬β . We will show that (c) holds.
By 2.6(v) it suffices to show that
{γ : α B γ } ∪ {γ : β B γ } ⊆ {γ : (α ∨ β)B γ }.
By hypothesis there is γ ′ such that (α ∨ β) B γ ′ and γ ′ 6`Σ ¬α. By RA we can assume
that γ ′ `Σ α. Let γ be such that α B γ , then by E-CM (α ∨ β)∧ α B γ . Using γ ′ and
E-R-Cut we conclude that (α ∨ β)B γ . It can be shown analogously that if β B γ , then
(α ∨ β)B γ . 2
Proof of Proposition 2.14. Suppose α B γ and β B δ and (α ∨ β)7 δ, we want to show
that (α ∨ β) B γ . Since ` β ↔ (α ∨ β) ∧ β and β B δ then it follows from E-R-Cut
that for all γ ′ if (α ∨ β) B γ ′, then γ ′ 6`Σ β . Since α B γ we have (α ∨ β)∧ α B γ .
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that (α ∨ β) 7 γ . By E-C-Cut there is γ ′ such that
(α ∨ β) B γ ′ and γ ′ 6`Σ α. By RA (Proposition 2.6) there is γ ′′ such that (α ∨ β) B γ ′′
and γ ′′ `Σ α. Finally, since ` α↔ (α ∨ β)∧ α and α B γ , then by E-R-Cut we conclude
that (α ∨ β)B γ , a contradiction. 2
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Proof of Proposition 2.17. Suppose that (α ∧ β)B γ and also that δ `Σ β for all δ such
that α B δ. It suffices to show that there is δ such that α B δ. Since (α ∧ β)B γ then (by
the definition of an explanatory relation) α is consistent withΣ , therefore by E-ConΣ there
is δ such that α B δ. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.20. It is obvious that if α `Σ β then α |∼ab β . On the other hand, if
α 6`Σ β , then α∧¬β 6`Σ⊥. Thus by E-ConΣ there is γ such that (α ∧¬β)B γ . Therefore
by E-Cut α B γ , hence α 6|∼ab β . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let B˜ be the explanatory relation associated with |∼ and let
|∼ab be the consequence relation associated with B˜ . We will show that |∼ is equal to |∼ab.
By definition of |∼ab and the hypothesis that |∼ is adequate we have
Cab(α)=
⋂{
Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }): α B˜γ }
=
⋂{
Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }): C(α)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }) & γ 6`Σ⊥
}
=C(α).
Observe that these equalities are valid even in the case that there is no γ such that α B˜γ
(equivalently, when C(α) contains all formulas). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
(1) It is obvious from the definition of B˜ that it satisfies RA, E-RW and RLE.
(2) It is obvious that if |∼ satisfies LLE, then B˜ satisfies LLE.
(3) Suppose that |∼ satisfies ConΣ . It follows easily from the hypothesis that |∼ is
adequate that B˜ satisfies E-ConΣ .
(4) Suppose that |∼ satisfies CM. To see that B˜ satisfies E-C-Cut let us suppose that
(α ∧ β) B˜γ and also that δ `Σ β for all δ such that α B˜ δ. We have to show that
α B˜γ . Suppose α |∼ ρ, it suffices to show that γ `Σ ρ. Since |∼ is adequate, from
the second part of the hypothesis of E-C-Cut we conclude that α |∼ β . Therefore
by CM we have C(α)⊆ C(α ∧ β), since C(α ∧ β)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }), then the result
follows.
(5) Suppose that |∼ satisfies the S-rule. To see that B˜ satisfies E-CM let α B˜γ and
γ `Σ β . We want to show that (α ∧ β) B˜γ . Since γ is consistent with Σ , it
suffices to show that C(α ∧ β)⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }). Let α ∧ β |∼ ρ, then by the S-rule
α |∼ β→ ρ. Since α B˜γ , then γ `Σ β→ ρ. Hence γ `Σ ρ.
(6) Suppose |∼ satisfies WDR. We will show that B˜ satisfies LOR. Suppose α B˜γ and
β B˜γ . By WDR we have that C(α ∨ β)⊆ Cn(C(α) ∪ C(β)). Then it is clear that
(α ∨ β) B˜γ .
(7) Suppose |∼ is preferential and satisfies DR. We will show that B˜ satisfies E-DR.
Suppose α B˜γ , β B˜ρ and (α ∨ β) 6B˜γ . Then there is δ such that α ∨ β |∼ δ and
γ 6`Σ δ. Since α B˜γ and C(α∨β)⊆ C(α)∪C(β) we have δ ∈ C(β). Now consider
any δ′ such that δ′ ∈ C(α ∨ β). We want to show that ρ `Σ δ′. By preferentiality
δ ∧ δ′ ∈ C(α ∨ β). But δ ∧ δ′ /∈ C(α), otherwise γ `Σ δ ∧ δ′ and therefore γ `Σ δ
which is a contradiction. Then by DR δ ∧ δ′ ∈ C(β). Hence ρ `Σ δ ∧ δ′ and thus
ρ `Σ δ′.
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(8) Suppose |∼ satisfies RM. We will show that B˜ satisfies E-R-Cut. Suppose
(α ∧ β) B˜γ and there is δ such that α B˜ δ with δ `Σ β . From the last assumption
and the definition of B˜ we conclude that α 6|∼ ¬β . Therefore by RM we have
C(α)⊆ C(α ∧ β), and the result follows.
(9) Suppose that |∼ is monotone. Since |∼ is monotone, then C(α) ⊆ C(α ∧ β).
Therefore, if (α ∧ β) B˜γ then α B˜γ . This says that B˜ satisfies E-Cut. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.5. For every α, let F(α) be a formula such that C(α)= Cn(F (α)).
Let us define B as follows: α B γ if γ 6`Σ⊥ and γ ≡ F(α). It is obvious that B is indeed
an explanatory relation satisfying RLE. Let |∼ab be the consequence relation associate
with B. It is easy to see that |∼ is equal to |∼ab. Now we will check the other postulates. It
follows that LLE (for B) follows from LLE for |∼. To see that E-CM holds, suppose
α B γ and γ `Σ β . We need to show that (α ∧ β) B γ . By hypothesis F(α) `Σ β ,
then it follows that α |∼ β . Since |∼ is cumulative, then C(α) = C(α ∧ β). From this it
follows that F(α)≡ F(α∧β) and therefore (α ∧ β)B γ . The proof that E-C-Cut holds is
similar. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (i)⇒ (ii). It is obvious that any causal relation satisfies RA. To
check that C holds let α and γ be two formulas consistent with Σ . Suppose that for all
δ consistent with Σ such that δ `Σ γ there is ρ such that ρ `Σ δ and α B ρ. We want to
show that Cab(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }). Let α |∼ab β and suppose toward a contradiction that
γ 6`Σ β . Since γ ∧ ¬β is consistent with Σ then by the hypothesis in C there is ρ such
that α B ρ and ρ `Σ γ ∧¬β . On the other hand, since α |∼ab β , then ρ `Σ β . Thus ρ `Σ⊥
which is a contradiction.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Suppose that B satisfies RA and C. It suffices to show that if γ 6`Σ⊥ and
Cab(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }), then α B γ . Let δ be any formula consistent with Σ such that
δ `Σ γ . Then there must exist ρ such that α B ρ and ρ 6`Σ ¬δ (otherwise ¬δ ∈ Cab(α)
which is not possible). Then ρ∧δ is consistent withΣ . By RA we conclude that α B ρ ∧ δ.
Therefore by C we get that α B γ . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.9. (i) implies (ii) follows from the fact that when E-ConΣ and E-
Cut hold, then |∼ab=`Σ (see Proposition 2.20). Therefore, since B is causal, then α B γ
iff Cn(Σ ∪ {α})⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }) iff γ `Σ α. On the other hand, to see that (ii) implies (i),
just notice that an explanatory relation defined as in (ii) satisfies E-Cut, E-ConΣ and it is
causal. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.12. It suffices to show that B satisfies C. Let γ1, . . . , γk be an
upper bound for {γ : α B γ }. Let θ = γ1 ∨ · · · ∨ γk . By E-RW we have that α B θ . Let α
and γ be formulas consistent with Σ . Suppose that for all δ such that δ 6`Σ⊥ and δ `Σ γ
there is ρ such that α B ρ and ρ `Σ δ. We want to show that α B γ . Suppose that α 7 γ
towards a contradiction. Then by RA we have that γ 6`Σ θ . Therefore γ ∧¬θ is consistent
with Σ . By hypothesis there is ρ such that α B ρ and ρ `Σ γ ∧¬θ , which contradicts that
θ is an upper bound. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Since ∗ preserves consistency, then it is clear that |< is a weak
explanatory relation (as defined in Section 4.2). It is obvious that LLE, RLE, E-Cut and
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full reflexivity holds. Notice that LOR follows from E-Cut and LLE. To check E-CM,
assume that α|<γ and also that γ ` β . Then γ,α ∈ K ∗ γ . Thus α ∧ β ∈ K ∗ γ . Finally,
E-RW follows from the Or rule for |∼K and ROR follows from DR for |∼K . 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4. From ConΣ it follows that |< is a weak explanatory relation.
(i) It is clear that |< is transitive, reflexive for Σ-consistent formulas and satisfies LLE,
RLE. E-RW follows easily from the Or rule. To check E-CM, let us assume that α|<γ
and γ `Σ β . Let α ∧ β |∼ ρ, then by the S-rule we have that α |∼ β→ ρ. By hypothesis
C(α) ⊆ C(γ ), thus γ |∼ β → ρ. By preferentiality and ConΣ from γ `Σ β is easy to
obtain γ |∼ β . Hence by RW γ |∼ ρ. Therefore C(α ∧ β) ⊆ C(γ ). To check E-C-Cut,
assume that α ∧ β |<γ and also that δ `Σ β for all δ such that α|<δ. In particular, since |<
is reflexive, we have that α `Σ β . Thus α |∼ β and therefore C(α)= C(α ∧ β).
(ii) DR says that C(α ∨ β)⊆ C(α) ∪C(β) from which it is obvious that LOR holds.
(iii) Suppose that |∼ is rational. We will use the following well known fact about rational
relations. For every pair of formulas α and β one of the following holds:
(i) C(α ∨ β)= C(α),
(ii) C(α ∨ β)= C(β),
(iii) C(α ∨ β)= C(α) ∩C(β).
From this is obvious that E-DR and ROR hold. It remains to be checked that E-R-Cut
holds. Suppose that α∧β |<γ and also that there is δ such that α|<δ and δ `Σ β . By RM it
suffices to show that α 6|∼ ¬β . Assume α |∼ ¬β towards a contradiction. Since α|<δ, then
δ |∼ ¬β . Since δ `Σ β , then by preferentiality and ConΣ , δ |∼ β . Therefore δ |∼⊥ which
contradicts the fact that δ is Σ-consistent. 2
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